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Abstract
The concept of an individual swapping his or her body with that of another person has captured the imagination of writers
and artists for decades. Although this topic has not been the subject of investigation in science, it exemplifies the
fundamental question of why we have an ongoing experience of being located inside our bodies. Here we report a
perceptual illusion of body-swapping that addresses directly this issue. Manipulation of the visual perspective, in
combination with the receipt of correlated multisensory information from the body was sufficient to trigger the illusion that
another person’s body or an artificial body was one’s own. This effect was so strong that people could experience being in
another person’s body when facing their own body and shaking hands with it. Our results are of fundamental importance
because they identify the perceptual processes that produce the feeling of ownership of one’s body.
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Introduction
We all experience our body to be part of ourselves. The
question of how this comes about has been discussed by
philosophers and psychologists for centuries [1,2,3,4]. Recent
advances in experimental science have made it possible for
cognitive neuroscientists to begin to investigate how we perceive
our body as an object distinct from the external world [2,5,6,7,8].
Having the experience of being the owner of one’s body is clearly
adaptive, and its function probably relates to the problem of
localising and correctly identifying oneself in the sensory
environment [9,10], a problem faced by all central nervous
systems [11]. Consider a fight between two or more individuals.
Survival depends on rapid identification and accurate localisation
of one’s own body. From neurology we know that these functions
can break down as people with pathological conditions affecting
frontal and parietal lobes can sometimes fail to recognise their
limbs as belonging to themselves [12,13,14]. Similarly, damage to,
or abnormal physiology of, frontal, parietal and temporal regions
can be associated with feelings of being outside the body [15,16].
Although these neurological observations suggest that certain
brain regions might be responsible for generating the habitual
experience of being located within one’s body and of owning it,
they tell us little about the underlying processes.
If we want to understand why our centre of awareness, or sense
of ‘self’, is located inside our body, illusions of bodily self-
perception could be invaluable. The study of illusions is a classical
approach adopted in psychology to learn more about the basic
processes that underlie normal perception. Indeed, some impor-
tant initial insights into the mechanisms underlying self-perception
of one’s own body have been gained through illusions. One such is
the so called ‘Rubber Hand Illusion’ where people have the
experience that a prosthetic hand is actually their own hand [17].
In this illusion, synchronous touches applied to a rubber hand in
full view of the participant, and the real hand, which is hidden
behind a screen, produce the sensations that the touch originates
from the rubber hand and a feeling of ownership of the artificial
hand. This suggests that the temporal and spatial patterns of visual
and somatosensory signals play an important role in how we come
to experience that a limb is part of our own body [5,7,18,19].
Another important factor in determining how we perceive our
own body is the adoption of the first person perspective [6,20].
When we look at ourselves directly, our limbs and body always
present themselves in certain orientations because our eyes are
fixed to our skull. By changing the visual perspective, it is possible
to induce the feeling of being in a different place [21,22,23] or,
even, illusory ‘out-of-body experiences’ where people seem to lose
ownership of their own body when observing it from the point of
view of another person (which we refer to as the third person
perspective) [6].
On the basis of this previous knowledge, we hypothesized that it
would be possible to induce illusions of owning an entire body
other than one’s own by the experimental manipulation of the
visual perspective in conjunction with correlated visual and
sensory signals being supplied to the respondent’s body. Our
experiments reveal that healthy volunteers can indeed experience
other people’s bodies, as well as artificial bodies, as being their
own. This effect is so robust that, while experiencing being in
another person’s body, a participant can face his or her biological
body and shake hands with it without breaking the illusion. The
existence of this illusion (and the identification of the factors
triggering it) represents a major advance because it informs us
about the processes that make us feel that we own our body in its
entirety.
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Ownership of a body other than one’s own
Experiment # 1. The aim of the first experiment was to
demonstrate that it is possible to elicit the illusion of ownership of
an entire body. The experimental manipulation consisted of seeing
a body other than oneself from the first person perspective whilst
being subjected to synchronised visual and tactile stimulation. We
used a life-sized mannequin, rather than another person’s body, to
exclude mismatches between small involuntary movements (e.g.
breathing). To provide the first-person visual perspective of the
other body, we developed the following set-up: Two CCTV
cameras were positioned on a male mannequin such that each
recorded events from the position corresponding to one of the
mannequin’s eyes. A set of head mounted displays (HMD)
connected to the cameras was worn by the participants, and
connected in such a way that the images from the left and right
video cameras were presented on the left and right eye displays,
respectively, providing a true stereoscopic image. Participants were
asked to tilt their heads downwards as if looking down at their
bodies. Thus, the participants saw the mannequin’s body where
they expected to see their own (Figure 1).
We used a short rod to repetitively stroke the participant’s
abdomen, which was out of view, in synchrony with identical
strokes being applied to the mannequin’s abdomen in full view of
the participant. As a control condition, we employed asynchro-
nous touches to the real and artificial abdomens (carefully
matching the total number and length of the strokes). After two
minutes of stimulation, the participants were asked to complete a
questionnaire on which they had to affirm or deny seven possible
perceptual effects using a seven-point Likert scale. Three
statements were designed to capture the illusory experience of
being the artificial body, and the other four served as controls for
suggestibility and task-compliance (Figure 2). From the completed
questionnaires it was evident that the participants had felt the
mannequin’s body to be their own body, and that they sensed the
touch of the rod directly on the mannequin’s abdomen in the
synchronous condition (p=.000, F(1, 223)=125.434, ANOVA).
Figure 1. Set-up. Experimental set-up to induce illusory ownership of an artificial body (left panel). The participant could see the mannequin’s body
from the perspective of the mannequin’s head (right panel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003832.g001
Figure 2. Questionnaire evidence for perceiving a mannequin’s body as one’s own. The questionnaire consisted of the seven statements
(S1–S7). S1–S3 referred to the illusion and S4–S7 served as controls. Participants indicated their responses on a seven-step scale ranging from ‘agree
strongly’ (+3) to ‘disagree strongly’ (23). The high rating scores on the illusion statements that were observed only in the synchronous condition
revealed that the participants experienced the illusion. The bars represent mean values and the error bars indicate standard errors. For details see
Results and Methods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003832.g002
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control condition (p=.703, F(1, 223)=1.513, ANOVA). The
responses to the three questions, which addressed the illusory
perception of owning the new body, differed significantly between
the two conditions (p=.000, F(1, 95)=107.508, GLM for
repeated measurements) (Figure 2).
Physiological evidence for owning a new body
Experiment # 2. To provide objective evidence for the
illusion of owning a body, we threatened the mannequin and
measured the evoked skin conductance response (SCR) as an
objective measure of anxiety. This test has been used before to
provide physiological evidence of body illusions [24,25], and there
is a direct relationship between the degree of anxiety evoked by
threatening an artificial body part and the strength of illusory body
ownership [25]. After a period of one minute of synchronous or
asynchronous stimulation as described above, participants
observed a knife ‘cutting’ the mannequin’s abdomen. To control
for a general effect of seeing an object approaching the body we
also included a second control condition where we touched the
mannequin’s abdomen with a neutral object (a spoon of the same
size as the knife) after one minute ofsynchronous and asynchronous
visual and tactile stimulation, that is, after the same amount and
kind of stimulation used in the ‘‘threatening’’ situation (see
Methods). The key observation was a significantly greater SCR
when we threatened the artificial body with the knife in the
synchronous condition than in either one of the two control
conditions (N=10, p=.009, Z=22.599, p=.028, Z=22.191,
two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test; see Figure 3). (This
response was also significantly stronger than the low level control
condition with the spoon threat after asynchronous stimulation;
p=.017, Z=22.395; not shown in Figure 3). There was no
significant difference between the knife vs. spoon threat-evoked
responses in the asynchronous condition (N=10, p=.484,
Z=2.700, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, the data are
not shown). Thus, the participants’ emotional systems responded as
one would anticipate a person to respond were their own body
being threatened.
Experiment # 3. In an additional control experiment we
ruled out the possibility that the threat-evoked anxiety responses
were limited to the particular body part that had been stimulated
(i.e. the abdomen). To this end, we compared the magnitude of the
SCR evoked by threats towards the abdomen after periods of
synchronous or asynchronous visual and tactile stimulation of
either the hands or the abdomen. The key observation was a
significantly higher threat-evoked SCR after synchronous visuo-
tactile stimulation of either the hands or the abdomen as
compared to the asynchronous control conditions (N=13,
p=0.011, Z=22.511 and p=0.033, Z=22.132, two-tailed
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test) (Figure 4). Thus, stimulation of
one body part seems to produce ownership of the entire body
being seen, i.e. the effect of ownership generalised to non-
stimulated body parts. These findings together with the
questionnaire data and spontaneous comments made after the
experiments, conclusively demonstrated that people had the
experience that the entire artificial body was their own body.
Experiment # 4. We also conducted an experiment to
examine our prediction that the body would need to look like a
human to be experienced as one’s own. Pilot experiments suggested
that the illusion did not work with objects that do not resemble a
human body, such as boxes, chairs and tables. Thus we conducted
an experiment where we applied threats to the mannequin or to a
rectangular object of the same size, after a period of synchronous or
asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation to the respondent and the
object. This experimental manipulation was also important because
it allowed us to eliminate the potentially confounding factor that
associated learning in the synchronous condition could have caused
the differences in SRC responses in the previous experiments. The
results of the data analysis revealed that the threat-evoked SCRs
were significantly stronger in the synchronous condition with the
mannequin than in the synchronous one with the rectangular object.
Figure 3. Physiological evidence for perceiving a mannequin’s
body as one’s own. The mean skin conductance responses (SCRs) for
10 participants when the illusory body was ‘‘threatened’’ with either a
knife or a spoon. The SCR is significantly greater in the illusion condition
than in either of the control conditions (p=.009 and p=.028, two-tailed
t-test). The response does not differ significantly between the two
control conditions (p=.484, two-tailed t-test). Error bars denote
standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003832.g003
Figure 4. Generalisation of body ownership from the stimulat-
ed body part to the rest of the body. The mean skin conductance
responses (SCRs) for 13 participants when the abdomen of the
mannequin was ‘‘threatened’’ with a knife after a period of synchronous
or asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation of the hands or the abdomen
(the four conditions on the x axis). The SCR is significantly greater in the
synchronous (illusion) conditions than in the control ones regardless of
whether the hands or the abdomen were stimulated (p=.011 and
p=.033, two tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test). Mean values and
standard errors are displayed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003832.g004
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reproduced a difference in the SCRs between synchronous and
asynchronous stimulation of the humanoid body (N=12, p=.04,
two-tailed t-test), without any such difference being observed in the
conditions with the rectangular object (p=.819, two-tailed t-test).
Thus, people can only experience human-like bodies as part of
themselves. In addition the differences in the SCR between
synchronous and asynchronous conditions are highly specific for
the illusion.
Swapping body with another person
Experiment # 5. In a full-blown body-swap experience one
would expect to be able to perceive being localized in another
human’s body during the performance of everyday actions.
Furthermore, if this is a genuine perceptual illusion, it should be
cognitively impregnable, and thus not break down even if one sees
one’s own body. The next experiment was designed to address
these issues and to put the idea of illusory body-swaps to a hard
test. We examined the counter-intuitive prediction that people
should be able to swap bodies with each other and, quite literally,
to shake hands with themselves while experiencing ownership of
another person’s body.
In this experiment, the experimenter was wearing a specially
designed helmet equipped with two CCTV cameras mounted in
such a way that they presented the viewpoint of the experimenter
(Figure 6). In turn, the participants stood directly opposite the
experimenter, wearing the HMDs, which were connected to the
CCTV cameras on the experimenter’s head. Thus, the partici-
pants were facing the cameras. The participants were asked to
stretch out their right arm and take hold of the experimenter’s
right hand, as if to shake it. This set-up allowed the participants to
see their physical bodies from the shoulders to slightly above the
knees. Hence, they could clearly recognize themselves and
distinguish between their own arm and the arm of the
experimenter. During the experiment, the participant and the
experimenter were asked to repeatedly squeeze each other’s hands
for two minutes. In the illusion condition, the participant and the
experimenter squeezed their hands in a synchronous manner,
whereas in the control condition they squeezed each other’s hands
Figure 5. Only an object that looks like a human body can be
owned. The figure displays the skin conductance responses (SCRs)
from 12 participants when the mannequin and a rectangular object (a
green box of the same size) were threatened in turn. The threat-evoked
SCR was significantly greater when the mannequin was threatened in
the synchronous condition than when the rectangular object was under
threat after the same synchronous stimulation (p=.008, two-tailed t-
test). A significant effect of synchronous vs. asynchronous stimulation
was observed only when the mannequin was threatened (p=.04, two
tailed t-test). Mean values and standard errors are displayed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003832.g005
Figure 6. Experimental set-up to induce the ‘body swap illusion’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003832.g006
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squeeze in a semi-random manner. We tested the set-up in pilot
experiments with ten participants (none of whom participated in
the experiment reported here). Interviews conducted immediately
after these initial experiments demonstrated that this set-up evoked
a vivid illusion that the experimenter’s arm was the participant’s
own arm and that the participants could sense their entire body
just behind this arm. Most remarkably, the participants’ sensations
of the tactile and muscular stimulation elicited by the squeezing of
the hands seemed to originate from the experimenter’s hand, and
not from their own clearly visible hand. In six other participants
we also observed that this illusion worked well when the cameras
were tilted downwards so that the participant could see the torso,
legs and both arms of the experimenter’s body during the manual
interaction.
With the intention of obtaining objective and quantifiable data
for this effect, we again used the procedure of threatening the
bodies and measuring the SCR. We employed an experimental
design where we occasionally threatened either the experimenter’s
hand or the participant’s hand during either the synchronous or
the asynchronous condition. As a threatening stimulus, we moved
a knife just above the wrists as if cutting the hand. Identical
plasters were placed on the wrists of the experimenter’s and the
participant’s hands to make this procedure safe and not too scary
(see Methods). We observed significantly stronger skin conduc-
tance responses when the knife was moved near the experimenter’s
wrist than when it was moved towards the participant’s own hand
in the synchronous condition (N=20, p=.0002, Z=23.099, two-
tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test) (Figure 7). No such difference
was observed during the asynchronous control condition, which
did not elicit a vivid illusion (N=20, p=0.737, Z=2.336, two-
tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test). The difference in SCR
observed when threatening the experimenter’s and participant’s
wrists in the two conditions was significant [interaction between
the main factors Hands (Experimenter’s vs. Participant’s hand) vs.
Condition (Synchronous vs. Asynchronous) was significant
(p=0.001, F(1, 19)=17.083, Two Way Repeated Measures
ANOVA on standardized variables]. Thus, the participants’
emotional systems reacted more strongly when the new body
was threatened than when their own body was under threat. This
is a quite remarkable observation that speaks of the strength of the
illusion. It is noteworthy that, after the experiment, several of the
participants spontaneously remarked: ‘‘Your arm felt like it was
my arm, and I was behind it’’, ‘‘I felt that my real/own body was
someone else’’ or ‘‘I was shaking hands with myself!’’ Finally, we
registered a greater SCR when the experimenter’s hand was
threatened in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous
one (N=20, p=0.037, Z=22.091, two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed
Ranks Test). Thus, the SCR results cannot be explained in terms
of a general emotional response to seeing the knife, nor can they
be explained by differences in the distance between the knife and
the cameras because these effects were all controlled for in our
experimental design.
It is relevant to point out here that several of the participants also
reportedaweakerillusionintheasynchronouscondition.Thus,even
though they were able to recognize their own body through the
headsets and visually detect the self-produced squeezing movements
of their own hand, they were still influenced by seeing the
experimenter’s body from the first person perspective. This effect
probably explains the lack of difference in the SCR observed when
threatening the two hands in the asynchronous condition. Even
though the mean rank of the observed SCR after threatening the
participants’ own hand was higher than that obtained by threat to
the experimenter’s hand in that condition (13.71 vs. 8.77), the effect
was not statistically significant (N=20, =.737, Z=2.336, two-
tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test).
Body swap and gender
The body-swap illusions worked well even though the mannequin
or the other person looked different from the participant. In the first
experiment there was no significant difference in rating scores
between male and female subjects in the synchronous illusion
condition, despite the fact that we only used a male mannequin
(N=32, p=.613, F(1,223)=.257, ANOVA) (Figure 8). Similarly, in
the second experiment, male and female subjects alike were able to
accept the arm of the female experimenter as their own. Further, we
compared the threat-evoked skin conductance responses between
males and females after threatening the new artificial body. To
obtain sufficient numbers of males and females to enable a statistical
comparison of the SCR, we pooled the data from the synchronous
and asynchronous conditions where the stimulation was applied on
the abdomen inexperiments three and four. We found no significant
difference in the illusion related SCR between males and females
(p=.952, F=.004, Two Way Repeated Measures ANOVA). These
observations suggest that gender identity, and differences in the
precise shape of the bodies,are not important factorsforperceiving a
body as one’s own.
Discussion
The results of our experiments demonstrate that healthy
volunteers can perceive another person’s body, or an artificial
humanoid body, to be their own. This works both when the
participant does not move and when he or she is executing
Figure 7. Objective evidence that people can experience
swapping body with other people. Mean skin conductance
responses (SCR) for twenty participants when either the experimenter’s
or the participant’s hands were threatened during the illusion and the
three control conditions (error bars represent standard errors). A
significantly higher SRC was registered when the ‘new’ body (the
experimenter’s hand) was threatened with the knife in the illusion
condition than when it was threatened in the control condition
(p=0.002, paired two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test) or when the
physical ‘old’ body was threatened in the illusion condition (p=.037,
paired two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test). The interaction between
the main factors (Hand x Condition) was significant (p=.001, Two Way
Repeated Measures ANOVA on standardized variables).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003832.g007
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perceptual illusion are: (i) a continuous match between visual and
somatosensory information about the state of the body; (ii) the
usage of a sufficiently humanoid body; and (iii) the adoption of a
first person visual perspective of the body. Particularly strong
evidence for this was the counter-intuitive demonstration that one
can face one’s physical body and shake hands with it whilst
experiencing the illusion of being within another person’s body.
These findings are of fundamental importance because they
identify the perceptual processes that make us feel that we own our
entire body. Our results also provide a new method to move a
person’s perceived centre of awareness from one body to another,
which could have important scientific, industrial and clinical
applications (as will be discussed below).
Objective evidence for the illusion of owning an entire body was
obtained by demonstrating that physical threats to the ‘new’ body
elicitedincreasedsweating(skinconductanceresponses)whenpeople
experienced the illusion. Similarly, threats to the ‘new body’ evoked
greater skin conductance responses than threats to the ‘old’ physical
one during the illusory body swapping. The SCR elicited byphysical
threats is a particularly good objective measure of body ownership.
Emotional defence reactions, such as fear and autonomic arousal,
have emerged in the course of evolution to enable one to protect
one’s own body from physical damage [26,27]. The causal chain
between threat-evoked SCR and the feeling of body ownership has
been clarified in earlier work. There is a direct linear relationship
between the strength of ownership of a hand and the degree of
anxiety experienced when the hand is being subjected to physical
threats [25]. This relationship is mirrored by the activity in
multisensory areas, related to ownership, and areas in the emotional
system, related toanxiety and pain anticipation [25].The SCR isthe
peripheral correlate of activity in brain structures related to
emotions, and is, therefore, greater when an owned rubber hand is
physically injured than when it is not experienced as part of one’s
body [24]. Thus the differences in threat-evoked SCR that we
observedinresponsetoourexperimentalmanipulationsreflectedthe
perceptual illusion of owning an entire body. The design of our
experiments, employing multiple control conditions, ruled out
potentially confounding factors such as attention to unexpected
sensory events, the emotional salience of the stimuli presented, or
associative learning (see Results for details).
The central relevance of the present findings is that they inform
us about how we come to experience that we own our bodies and
why we have an on-going feeling of being located inside them
(sometimes called ‘embodiment’ [28]). In the present illusions, the
visual, tactile, proprioceptive information and the predicted
sensory feedback from these modalities during active movements
were temporally and spatially congruent in an ego-centric
reference frame centred on a new body. Thus, the matching of
multisensory and motor signals from the first person perspective is
sufficient to create a full sense of ownership of one’s own entire
body. This conclusion certainly contrasts with the traditional text-
book wisdom which emphasises that body perception is a direct
result of bottom-up processing of afferent signals from muscles,
joints and skin.
Earlier work on body ownership has exclusively studied a single
limb, the arm, using the traditional rubber hand illusion. Thus,
until now, it was not known whether the principles underlying
changes in ownership would generalise to other body parts, or to
an entire body. Many multisensory brain areas seem to have
particularly large representations of the hands and upper limbs
[29,30], and visual information is particularly important for
guiding human hand actions [31,32,33,34] and localising the arms
in space [35]. The present data show that correlations of visual
and tactile signals coming to a single body part (the abdomen or a
hand) are sufficient to cause a feeling of ownership of the entire
body (referred to as ‘whole-body ownership’). Thus the effect of
correlated visual and tactile events on one limb generalises to non-
stimulated body parts. This implies that visual and somatosensory
signals from different body parts are analysed and interpreted
together, i.e. that there are inter-dependences between the
multisensory integration of different body parts. The central body
representation is a ‘map of connected nodes’ where limbs and
body segments form a continuous whole. It is this structure of the
body representation coupled with the fact that the perceptual
systems tend to produce single resolutions when resolving sensory
conflicts [36,37,38] that makes whole-body illusions possible. The
feeling of ownership of an entire body is , therefore, the result of a
consistent pattern of spatially and temporally congruent multisen-
sory signals from all body parts and the integration of this
information in ego-centric reference frames centred on the various
limbs and segments (that is, arm-centred, head-centred, etc).
Figure 8. Questionnaire results for both sexes. The questionnaire consisted of the seven statements (S1–S7). There was no significant
difference between the responses of female and male participants in the synchronous condition (p=.613, F(1,223)=.257, ANOVA). For details, see the
Results and Methods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003832.g008
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the first person perspective is critical for the experience of owning
a body. In our ‘body swap’ experiment (Experiment #5) there was
a direct conflict between the perspective seen from the new body
and the sight of the real body observed from a third person
perspective. The synchronized movements of the two people
squeezing each other’s hands did not provide evidence in favour of
either body being one’s own, so the critical determinant for
ownership in this set-up was the visual perspective. The first
person perspective was clearly dominant since most participants
experienced being in the new body. This dominance of the first
person perspective probably explains why people did not show a
very strong response when their actual body was threatened in the
asynchronous condition. The incongruent tactile and muscular
information in the asynchronous condition led to a decrease in the
strength of the illusion, but could not completely abolish it, as
reported by many participants. Importantly, the effect of varying
the timing of the seen and the felt hand movements was significant
only from the first-person perspective. The reason for this
probably relates to the fact that central processing of multisensory
signals from the body operates in egocentric reference frames
[18,30,32,39,40,41,42,43] which presupposes the first person
perspective.
But why is bodily perception so malleable? The function of body
ownership is probably related to the problem of localizing and
correctly identifying the body in space. In this process, speed and
accuracy are of utmost importance. According to recent statistical
models of perception, the interpretation of multisensory signals
could be sped up and made more precise by incorporating
memory information (‘priors’) in the decision process [44,45,46].
In this framework, the body-swap illusions would arise as a result
of the brain’s tendency to rely heavily on a lifetime of experiences
of seeing the world from the first person perspective with eyes that
are fixed at a specific position on the skull, and the fact that the
body typically produces certain patterns of sensory signals from the
different modalities. Thus it is likely that the multisensory
mechanisms involved in producing the present illusions are
continuously engaged to refine the central estimate of the location
of one’s own body in natural situations. This implies that, in the
experiments reported here, the spatial dimensions experienced as
being occupied by one’s own body, and the co-localisation of this
sensed body and the physical body, are produced by this
perceptual integration mechanism. This would explain why we
have an on-going experience of being located inside our bodies.
The present illusions are consistent with the physiological and
anatomical organisation of the multisensory brain. It is possible
that bimodal and multimodal cells in premotor and posterior
parietal areas could play important roles by mediating critical
multisensory integration [7,41,42,43,47]. These areas are part of a
system that controls actions and they contain many neurons that
integrate visual, tactile and proprioceptive information in head
and body-part centred reference frames [7,41,42,43,47]. Further-
more, these multisensory cells are sensitive to the temporal and
spatial congruency of multisensory signals [47]. Thus, this
neuronal system has the capacity to perform the binding of visual,
tactile, proprioceptive and motor signals in ego-centric coordinate
systems centred on the new body.
The sensory experience of one’s own body from the first person
perspective is different from recognising oneself in mirrors, TV
screens or other image representations as observed from a third
person perspective. When we recognise ourselves in a mirror, for
example, we do not have the experience that we are actually in the
mirror, or that there has been a change in ownership of our body.
It is therefore likely that the present illusions involve different
processes than those probed in earlier experiments on self-
recognition in mirrors [48] or self-recognition of bodies [8,49]
and body parts observed from a third person perspective. A key
difference probably is that, in the body-swap illusions, the visual,
tactile and proprioceptive information is mapped directly onto the
multisensory neuronal populations that represent one’s own body
in ego-centric coordinates.
The present findings could have groundbreaking industrial and
clinical applications. Experiencing swapping bodies with other
individuals could provide a valuable tool for research on body
image disorders or self-identity in social psychology. Likewise,
experiencing ‘becoming’ a humanoid robot in tele-robotics and
feeling ownership of simulated bodies in virtual reality applications
would probably enhance user control, realism, and the feeling of
‘presence’ [21,22,23,50]. With respect to the tele-operator literature,
it is interesting to note that there are many anecdotal reports of
people feeling a robotic arm to be like their own when the robot arm
is viewed froma first person perspective via cameras mounted on the
robot and when the movements of the robot’s arms reproduce the
person’s movements in real time [51]. The present paper provides
the experimental data and a cognitive-neuroscience-informed model
for explaining how illusory ownership of limbs and entire bodies
might be evoked in tele-operator systems (see also Slater et al. [50]).
In conclusion, these experiments have demonstrated how
remarkably easy it is to ‘move’ a human centre of awareness from
one body to another. This speaks directly to the classical question of
the relationship between human consciousness and the body, which
has been discussed by philosophers, psychologists, and theologians
for centuries [1,3,4,11]. The continuous integration of multisensory
and motor signals in ego-centric reference frames thus maintains the
co-alignment between the experienced self and the physical body.
Methods
Participants
For each of the five experiments, we recruited separate groups
of naı ¨ve healthy volunteers. In the first experiment, we tested
thirty-two young adults (sixteen females, mean age 2566 years).
The second experiment involved ten individuals (two females,
mean age 2564 years), the third one consisted of a group of
thirteen participants (eight females, mean age 2766.5 years), and
the fourth one was another group of twelve volunteers (four
females, mean age 2966 years). For the fifth experiment, twenty
participants (13 females, mean age=2766.5 years) were recruited.
All participants gave their written informed consent prior to
participating in the relevant experiment. The studies were
approved by the local Ethical Committee of Karolinska Institute.
HMDs
In all experiments, participants wore a set of head-mounted
displays, HMD, (Cybermind Visette Pro PAL, Cybermind
Interactive, Maastricht, the Netherlands; Display Resolu-
tion=6406480; true stereoscopic vision) with a wide field-of-view
(diagonal field of view=71.5u). These were connected to two
synchronized colour CCTV cameras (Protos IV, Vista, Woking-
ham, Berkshire, UK) attached side-by-side to special helmets. The
spacing between the cameras was adjusted for each participant to
ensure that it matched the distance between their eyes (8–10 cm).
The CCTV signals were relayed directly to the HMDs, without
any software conversion, and thus were presented without
noticeable delay. In experiments one, two, three, and four, the
participants could clearly recognise the mannequin as a manne-
quin and in experiment five, they could see their own body and
that of the other person.
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Recording equipment. The skin conductance responses
were recorded with a Biopac System MP150 (Goleta, USA).
Two electrodes were attached to the index and middle fingers of
the participants’ left hands using Signa electrode gel (Parker
Laboratories, INC., New Jersey, USA). The data were registered
with a Biopac System MP150 (100 samples per second) and
processed with the Biopac software Acqknowledge for Windows
ACK100W. The participant wore the electrodes for a few minutes
before starting the recording. The parameters of the recording
were as follows: The gain switch was set to 5 mmho/V and the
CAL2 Scale Value was set to 5. The timing of the threat events
was indicated in the raw data files during the recordings by the
experimenter pressing a key.
Experimental design. In experiments 2 to 5 we used the
following experimental designs:
Experiment #2 consisted of three sessions, each of which consisted
of four one minute long periods of synchronous or asynchronous
stroking (each stroke was approximately 3 cm long; about 60 strokes
were applied per minute). At the end of each period, the mannequin
was threatened either with a knife or with a spoon. The order of the
stimulation conditions and the type of object used as threat were
randomized across sessions and participants[e.g. (SkAsAk Ss) (As Ss
Sk Ak) (As Sk Ak Ss), where S and A stand for synchronous or
asynchronousstimulationand kandsstandfor knife orspoonthreat,
respectively]. The data obtained from threatening the body with the
spoon in the asynchronous condition was used as a low level control
and is not displayed in the figures.
In Experiment # 3 we used a similar protocol. It again consisted
of three sessions, each of which consisted of four one minute long
periods of synchronous or asynchronous stroking of the hands or
of the abdomen. At the end of each period, the abdomen of the
mannequin was threatened with a knife; the type of stimulation
and its location (i.e. hands vs. abdomen) were randomized across
sessions and participants [e.g. (Sh Aa Ah Sa) (Aa Sa Sh Ah) (Aa Sh
Ah Sa), where S and A stand for synchronous or asynchronous
stimulation and h and a represent the place where the stimulation
was applied, i.e., to the hands or the abdomen, respectively].
Experiment # 4 was conducted according to similar protocol to
that used in the second and third experiments (three, four minute
long sessions, with four conditions). The conditions were
synchronous or asynchronous visual and tactile stimulation of
the mannequin’s body or of an object that did not look like a
human body. This object was a dark green rectangular box of the
same height and width as the mannequin’s body. The touches on
the object were applied at the same height as on the mannequin’s
body (thus at the same distance from the cameras) and the knife
was moved along its short side in the same way it was moved along
the mannequin’s abdomen. During the short breaks between the
sessions when the mannequin was replaced by the object, the
goggles were switched off to prevent the participants seeing what
change was taking place.
Experiment # 5, where the experimenter and the participants
squeezed each other’s hands, consisted of four sessions lasting two
minutes apiece. During the whole experiment we played a
metronome out loud at 40 beats per minute to assist in providing
a steady and regular rhythm of the squeezing of the hand motion.
In each session we threatened the real arm or the ‘‘owned’’ new
arm twice. Two sessions corresponded to the illusion condition,
with synchronous hand squeezing being conducted, and two
sessions to the asynchronous condition. The two sessions used in
the experiment were repeated twice in a pseudo-randomized order
[(1, 2, 2, 1) or (2, 1, 1, 2)] to minimize the effect of presentation
order. Within each session we randomized the order of which
hand was threatened (either the experimenter’s hand or the
participant’s hand). Further, the order of sessions and presenta-
tions were balanced across individuals. Within each session we
threatened the hands once every 25 to 35 seconds, with the exact
timing being varied to avoid anticipatory effects.
SCR: stimulation procedure and analysis. Each time that
the knife or spoon was slid along the mannequin’s abdomen
(experiments 2, 3 and 4) or the knife moved above the wrists
(experiment 5) took approximately 3 seconds. The motion was
performed so that the knife and the spoon were always moved
along the horizontal axis from left to right in the field of view of the
HMDs. During the movement the object was inserted slightly into
the mannequin’s abdomen in a small gap between the upper and
lower parts of the mannequin’s body. To make this possible we
placed two circular sticky patches (0.5 cm high, 1 cm diameter)
between the torso and the lower part of the body of the
mannequin, thereby, creating a cleft in the lower part of the
abdomen of the mannequin that was not visible from the
perspective of the cameras (Figure 9a). The objects used to
provide the threat were moved along the abdomen in such a way
that it looked as if the object was ‘cutting’ into the dummy’s body
from the perspective of the cameras (Figure 9b/c). In the fourth
experiment the knife was run in full contact with the rectangular
object, but we could not induce the visual effect of cutting into it
because of its flat surface. For this particular experiment we
adjusted the way that the knife threat was applied to the
mannequin so that the knife was moved along touching the
dummy’s body, but without appearing to cut into it. Great care
was taken to move the knife or the spoon in exactly the same way
from trial to trial. The SCR was identified as the peak in the
conductance that occurs up to 5 seconds after the onset of the
threat stimuli. The amplitude of the increase in conductance was
measured as the difference between the maximal and minimal
value of the response identified in this time-window. We calculated
the average of the all responses including the trials where no
response was apparent, thus, analysing the magnitude of the SRC
[52]. Participants who did not show a reliable threat-evoked SCR
(‘null responders’), i.e. had zero responses in more than two-thirds
of the trials, were excluded from the analysis.
Statistical analysis. The data obtained from the five
different experiments were tested using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test to determine whether they fitted the requirements
for a normal distribution. Only the data from the first and the
fourth experiments passed the normality test, therefore we used
parametric statistical tests to process the data obtained in those two
experiments and the data from the other three experiments were
tested with non-parametric statistical tests. In all statistical tests, we
set alpha to 5%.
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Figure 9. Illustration of the procedure to simulate cutting the
mannequin with either a knife or a spoon in Experiment #2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003832.g009
Body Swap Illusion
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 December 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 12 | e3832References
1. James W, ed (1890) Prinicples of Psychology: H Holt and Company.
2. Jeannerod M (2003) The mechanism of self-recognition in humans. Behavioural
Brain Research 142: 1–15.
3. Merleau-Ponty M, ed (1945) Phe ´nome ´nologie de la perception. Paris:
Gallimard.
4. Metzinger T, ed (2003) Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity:
MIT Press.
5. Botvinick M (2004) Neuroscience. Probing the neural basis of body ownership.
Science 305: 875–877.
6. Ehrsson HH (2007) The Experimental Induction of Out-of-Body Experiences.
Science 317: 1048–.
7. Ehrsson HH, Spence C, Passingham RE (2004) That’s My Hand! Activity in
Premotor Cortex Reflects Feeling of Ownership of a Limb. Science 305:
875–877.
8. Lenggenhager B, Tadi T, Metzinger T, Blanke O (2007) Video Ergo Sum:
Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness. Science 317: 1096–1099.
9. Graziano M, Botvinick M (2002) How the brain represents the body: insights
from neurophysiology and psychology. In: Prinz W, Hommel B, eds (2002)
Common Mechanisms in Perception and Action: Attention and Performance
XIX. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Makin TR, Holmes NP, Ehrsson HH (2008) On the other hand: Dummy hands
and peripersonal space. Behavioural Brain Research 191: 1–10.
11. Churchland PS (2002) Self-Representation in Nervous Systems. Science 296:
308–310.
12. Baier B, Karnath H-O (2008) Tight Link Between Our Sense of Limb
Ownership and Self-Awareness of Actions. Stroke 39: 486–488.
13. Critchley M (1953) The Parietal Lobes. London: Edward Arnold.
14. Meador KJ, Loring DW, Feinberg TE, Lee GP, Nichols ME (2000) Anosognosia
and asomatognosia during intracarotid amobarbital inactivation. Neurology 55:
816–820.
15. Blanke O, Landis T, Spinelli L, Seeck M (2004) Out-of-body experience and
autoscopy of neurological origin. Brain 127: 243–258.
16. Blanke O, Ortigue S, Landis T, Seeck M (2002) Neuropsychology: Stimulating
illusory own-body perceptions. Nature 419: 269–270.
17. Botvinick M, Cohen J (1998) Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see. Nature
391: 756–756.
18. Costantini M, Haggard P (2007) The rubber hand illusion: Sensitivity and
reference frame for body ownership. Consciousness and Cognition 16: 229–240.
19. Tsakiris M, Haggard P (2005) The Rubber Hand Illusion Revisited: Visuotactile
Integration and Self-Attribution. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance 31: 80–91.
20. Gibson JJ, ed (1979) The ecological approach to visual perception. Hillsdale,
New Jersey Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
21. Minsky M (1980) Telepresence. Omni 45.
22. Sanchez-Vives MV, Slater M (2005) From presence to consciousness through
virtual reality. Nat Rev Neurosci 6: 332–339.
23. Slater M, Frisoli A, Tecchia F, Guger C, Lotto B, et al. (2007) Understanding
and realizing presence in the Presenccia project. IEEE Comput Graph Appl 27:
90–93.
24. Armel KC, Ramachandran VS (2003) Projecting sensations to external objects:
evidence from skin conductance response. Proceedings of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences 270: 1499–1506.
25. Ehrsson HH, Wiech K, Weiskopf N, Dolan RJ, Passingham RE (2007)
Threatening a rubber hand that you feel is yours elicits a cortical anxiety
response. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104: 9828–9833.
26. Craig AD (2002) How do you feel? Interoception: the sense of the physiological
condition of the body. Nat Rev Neurosci 3: 655–666.
27. Craig AD (2003) Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the
body. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 13: 500–505.
28. Lenggenhager B, Smith S, Blanke O (2006) Functional and neural mechanisms
of embodiment: importance of the vestibular system and the temporal parietal
junction. Rev Neurosci 17: 643–657.
29. Graziano M, Cooke D (2006) Parieto-frontal interactions, personal space, and
defensive behavior. Neuropsychologia 44: 845–859.
30. Rizzolatti G, Scandolara C, Matelli M, Gentilucci M (1981) Afferent properties
of periarcuate neurons in macaque monkeys. I. Somatosensory responses.
Behavioural Brain Research 2: 125–146.
31. Castiello U (2005) The neuroscience of grasping. Nat Rev Neurosci 6: 726–736.
32. Graziano MSA (1999) Where is my arm? The relative role of vision and
proprioception in the neuronal representation of limb position. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 96:
10418–10421.
33. Jeannerod M (1984) The timing of natural prehension movements. Journal of
motor behaviour 16: 235–254.
34. Jeannerod M, Arbib MA, Rizzolatti G, Sakata H (1995) Grasping objects: the
cortical mechanisms of visuomotor transformation. Trends in Neurosciences 18:
314–320.
35. Welch RB, Warren DH (1986) Intersensory interactions. In: Kaufman L,
Thomas JP, eds (1986) Handbook of Perception and Human Performance. New
York: K.R. Boff. pp 25.21–25.36.
36. Lackner J (1988) Some proprioceptive influences on the perceptual represen-
tation of body shape and orientation. Brain 111: 281–297.
37. Levelt WJM, ed (1965) On binocular rivalry. The Hague: Van Gorcum.
38. Naito E, Roland PE, Ehrsson HH (2002) I Feel My Hand Moving: A New Role
of the Primary Motor Cortex in Somatic Perception of Limb Movement.
Neuron 36: 979–988.
39. Andersen RA, Snyder LH, Bradley DC, Xing J (1997) Multimodal represen-
tation of space in the posterior parietal cortex and its use in planning
movements. Annual Review of Neuroscience 20: 303–330.
40. Duhamel J-R, Bremmer F, BenHamed S, Graf W (1997) Spatial invariance of
visual receptive fields in parietal cortex neurons. Nature 389: 845–848.
41. Fogassi L, Gallese V, Fadiga L, Luppino G, Matelli M, et al. (1996) Coding of
peripersonal space in inferior premotor cortex (area F4). J Neurophysiol 76:
141–157.
42. Graziano MSA, Cooke DF, Taylor CSR (2000) Coding the Location of the Arm
by Sight. Science 290: 1782–1786.
43. Graziano MSA, Hu XT, Gross CG (1997) Visuospatial Properties of Ventral
Premotor Cortex. J Neurophysiol 77: 2268–2292.
44. Deneve S, Pouget A (2004) Bayesian multisensory integration and cross-modal
spatial links. J Physiol Paris 98: 249–258.
45. Koerding KP, Beierholm U, Ma WJ, Quartz S, Tenenbaum JB, et al. (2007)
Causal Inference in Multisensory Perception. Plos One.
46. Wolpert DM (2007) Probabilistic models in human sensorimotor control.
Human Movement Science 26: 511–524.
47. Avillac M, Ben Hamed S, Duhamel J-R (2007) Multisensory Integration in the
Ventral Intraparietal Area of the Macaque Monkey. J Neurosci 27: 1922–1932.
48. Altschuler EL, Ramachandran VS (2007) A simple method to stand outside
oneself. Perception 36: 632–634.
49. Stratton GM (1899) The spatial harmony of touch and sight. Mind 8: 492–505.
50. Slater M, Perez-Marcos D, Ehrsson HH, Sanchez-Vives MV (2008) Towards a
digital body: The virtual arm illusion. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
51. Cole J, Sacks O, Waterman I (2000) On the immunity principle: a view from a
robot. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4: 167–167.
52. Dawson M, Schell A, Filion D (2007) The electrodermal system. In: Cacioppo J,
Tassinary L, Berntson G, eds (2007) The handbook of psychophysiology.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp 152–191.
Body Swap Illusion
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 December 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 12 | e3832